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[Crim. No. 7932. In Bank. Jan. 15, 1965.] 
In re EUGENE R. WALTREUS on Habeas Corpus. 
[la, Ib] Habeas Corpus-Petition-Sufficiency.-In a petition for 
habeas corpus, allegations concerning the asserted perjury of 
a prosecution witness did not warrant appointment of a referee 
where the matters relied on were either brought out at the trial 
or were then known by petitioner and could have been shown. 
[2] Id.-Petition-Contents.-An application for habeas corpus 
on the ground of perjured testimony must set forth facts 
that prove perjury and knowledge thereof by the prosecution 
and must show that those facts existed independently of the 
contradictions appearing at trial; it must also appear that 
petitioner had no opportunity to present the alleged true 
matter at trial. 
[3] Id.-Petition-Sumciency.-In a petition for habeas corpus 
claiming the prosecution knowingly used perjured testimony, 
allegations pointing out the contradictory testimony at the 
trial by a prosecution witness, his purported employer, and a 
bail bondsman concerning the identity of the employer of the 
witness and payments to the bail bondsman did not suffice to 
support the claimed use of perjured testimony. 
[4] Id.-Petition-Sufficiency.-In a habeas corpus proceeding 
based on the prosecution's alleged knowing use of perjured 
testimony, it was clear that petitioner had the opportunity 
[1) SeeCal.Jur.2d, Habeas Corpus, § 77; Am.Jur., Habeas Cor-
pus (1st ed § 122 et seq). 
licK. Dig. References: [1,3-5) Habeas Corpus, § 51; [2) Habeas 
Corpus, § 52; [6-8] Criminal Law, §§ 104.5, 271; [9] Criminal Law, 
§ 1019; [10] Criminal Law, § 107; [11] Explosions, §l7; [12] 
Habeas Corpus, § 12. 
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to present the alleged true matter at the trial where there were 
allegations in the petition that a prosecution witness admitted 
he made a mistake in testifying that while listening on an ex-
tension telephone he heard a number being dialed and a COD-
versation between a codefendant and petitioner when pctitioner 
asked him if he was aware a telephone conversation could 
not be made if he had lifted the extension receiver. 
[6] ld.-Petition-Sufficiency.-A petitioner for habeas corpus, 
claiming the prosecution's use of perjured testimony, relied 
solely on matters known to him at the trial where his petition 
contained allegations that an objection was sustained to his 
impeaching evidence for failure to lay a proper foundation 
and that he appeared for himself and did not know how to 
lay the necessary foundation. 
[6] Criminal Law-Rights of Accused-Rights of Discovery and 
Inspection: Compelling Production of Documents.-A defend-
ant can compel the People to produce statements of proseeu-
tion witnesses relating to matters covered in their testimony. 
[7] ld.-Rights of Accused-Rights of Discovery and Inspection: 
Compelling Production of Documents.-Where defendant seeks 
to examine statements of prosecution witnesses, but the docu-
ments contain matters unrelated to the defendant's case whose 
disclosure would interfere with effective law enforcement, the 
trial court should excise the unrelated parts, which should be 
preserved to permit reexamination by the appellate court of 
the entire text to determine the correctness of the trial court's 
ruling. 
[8] ld.-Rights of Accused-Rights of Discovery and Inspection: 
Compelling Production of Documents.-Though deletion, by the 
trial judge, of parts unrelated to defendant's case from docu- . 
ments relating to matters covered by testimony of prosecution 
witnesses before disclosure of the documents to defendant does 
not permit defense counsel to determine the relevance and 
importance of the deleted parts, such procedure affords a 
reasonable compromise between defendant's right of use and 
the prosecution's need to withhold irrelevant confidential in-
formation and is consistent with the rule that public records 
are subject to inspection, except when expressly made priv-
ileged. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 1892,1881, subd. 5.) 
[9] ld.-Judgment-Collateral Attack.-Tbougb portions of a doc-
un:.ent rMating to matters covered by the testimony of prose-
cution witnesses were withheld from defendant, and though 
the document was not reex&mined on appeal from the judgment 
of conviction, it cannot be assumed on collateral attack that 
[6] See Cal.Jur.2d, Trial, § 382; Am.Jur., Evidence (1st ed § 917 
et seq). 
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the trial court acted improperly in withholding portionR of the 
document determined by the trial court to have nothing to do 
with his eaRe. 
[10] Id.-Rigbts of Accused-Aid of Counsel.-Qn being advispd 
of the right to representation by the public defender, who ap-
peared for a codefendant, it was incumbent on defendant to 
raise in the trial court the matter of his desire to have other 
counsel Misigned because of alleged conflict of interest. 
[11] Explosions-Criminal Liability-Constitutionality of Statutes. 
-The ab~H'nce of a definition of "explosive" in Health. & Saf. 
Code, § }2354, making it a felony to maliciously use any ex-
plosive in a building, did not make the section so vague as to 
be unconstitutional where, at the time of defendant's violation 
of § 123M, the term "explosives" as used in the chapter con-
taining tlll1t section was defined by § 12350. 
[12] Habeas Corpus-Writ as Substitute for Appea.l.-Ordinarily, 
habeas corpus cannot serve as a second appeal. 
PROCEEDING in habeas corpus to secure release from 
custody. Lewis Drucker, Judge. Order to show cause dis-
charged and writ denied. 
Morris IAlvine for Petitioner. 
Thomas C. Lynch, Attorney General, William E. James, 
Assistant Attorney General, Norman H. Sokolow, Deputy 
Attorney General, William B. McKesson, District Attorney 
(Los Angel{'S) and Samuel Mayerson, Deputy District Attor-
ney, for Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, C. J.-Petitioner was convicted of assault with 
a deadly welll)(>ll, using and placing an explosive in or near 
buildings wit.h intent to destroy them, and conspiracy to com-
mit such act.~ and to obtain property by means of threat', of 
mjury to tIll' owner and his property.l The judgment was 
affirmed (People v. Darnold (1963) 219 Cal.App.2d 561 [33 
Cal.Rptr. 36!) J ), petitions for rehearing and for hearing by 
this court '\\'(,1'e denied, and the United States Supreme Court 
denied certiorari (Waltreus v. California, 376 U.S. 959 
[84 S.Ct. V8], 11 L.Ed.2d 977]). Petitioner now seeks a 
IPetitioner Wl\8 jointly indicted for the offenses with five other defend· 
ants, Brajevit"ll. Mi8so, Le Fave, Darnold, and Lenahan. After the jury 
was sworn and l)('fore testimony was taken the charges against Brajevich 
WE're dismissrd IIpon the prosecution '8 request. The charges against. 
1Ilisso WE're 8uh.,·qucntly dismissed. Le Fave was found not guilty, and 
the remaining ,1(·fcnduuts were found guilty. 
) 
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writ of habeas corpus on the ground, among others, that his 
conviction was obtained by perjured testimony knowingly used 
by the prosecution. 
It is unnecessary to set forth in detail the evidence reported 
in about 3,500 pages of transcript. In brief, there was evi-
dence that petitioner induced others to commit an assault upon 
J osepb Peskin and to place dynamite in his business estab-
lishments, that petitioner sought by such means to compel 
Peskin to return a business to Le Fave, and that petitioner 
conspired with others to commit the offenses and to obtain 
property from Peskin by means of threats to his person. 
[la] One of the principal prosecution witnesses, Brajevich, 
testified that at various meetings held at petitioner's office al:d 
elsewhere plans were made relating to the assault and the use 
of dynamite. Petitioner contends that Brajevich's testimony 
that he "had been at the office of the petitioner when the al-
leged arrangements were made" was perjured and was known 
by the prosecution to be perjured. He alleges that other wH-
nesses testified that petitioner had vacated the office before 
the dates of the asserted meetings. He also alleges that Braje-
vich testified that the meetings took place in one of two small 
offices at the rear of the main office, that no such small offices 
exist, and that this fact was known or should have been known 
by the officers investigating the case. 
[2] An application for habeas corpus on the ground of 
perjured testimony must not only set forth the facts that 
prove perjury and knowledge thereof by the prosecution, but 
must also show that those facts existed independently of the 
contradictions appearing at the trial. (In re Manchester 
(1949) 33 Ca1.2d 740, 742 [204 P.2d 881].) It must also 
appear that the petitioner had no opportunity to present the 
alleged true matter at the trial; that is, that there was such 
suppression of the· truth by the authorities that he was pre-
cluded from discovering it and using it at the trial. (In re 
Manchester, supra, at p. 742; Green v. United States (1st Cir. 
1958) 256 F.2d 483, 484; see In re Imbler (1963) 60 Ca1.2d 
554, 565 [35 Cal.Rptr. 293, 387 P.2d 6].) 
[lb] The' allegations regarding the asserted perjury by 
Brajevich do not warrant the appointment of a referee, for 
the matters relied on were either brought out at the trial or 
were known by petitioner at the time of trial and could have 
been shown. 
[3] In claiming that the prosecution knowingly presented 
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perjured testimony, petitioner points to testimony by Braje-
vich concerning the identity of his employer and payments 
to a bail bondsman and to contradictory testimony by the pur-
ported employer and the bail bondsman. Such contradictions 
are insufficient to support petitioner's claim. (In re Man-
chester, supra. 33 Ca1.2d 740, 742.) 
[4] A second claim of perjury involved the testimony of 
a witness namea McLin that, while listening on an extension 
telephone, he heard a number being dialed and then a con-
versation between Le Fave and a man who responded to peti-
tioner's name. Petitioner alleges that a number cannot be 
dialed while an extension receiver is off the hook, that the 
prosecution therefore must have known McLin's testimony 
was perjured and that, when he asked McLin whether he was 
aware a telephone conversation could not be made if he had 
lifted the extension receiver, McLin admitted "he had made 
a mistake." It is clear from petitioner's allegations that he 
had an opportunity to present the alleged true matter at the 
trial. . 
[5] A third charge of perjury was based on the testimony 
of a witness named Bulat. The petition alleges: Bulat testified 
at the grand jury hearing that he had witnessed several meet-
ings of the defendants in petitioner's office. Before the trial 
he told petitioner and two attorneys that his testimony was 
false and that he had given the testimony because state officers 
had threatened to prosecute him for several burglaries unless 
he "testified as the officers stated that he should." On infor-
mation and belief petitioner alleges that Bulat made an offer 
to the district attorney to correct his testimony and was told 
he should stand by his original story.2 At the trial Bulat, who 
was called as a prosecution witness, testified that he had 
"heard certain conversations" between petitioner and other 
defendants at petitioner's office. Petitioner attempted to in-
troduce evidence of the foregoing alleged facts to impeach 
Bulat's testimony, but an objection on the ground that a 
proper foundation had not been laid was sustained, and peti-
tioner, who appeared in propria persona, did not know how 
2The Attorney General points out that at the trial Bulat gave testimony 
inconsistent with some of the foregoj.ng allegations. Bulat testified that 
officers had not threatened him or told him what to testify to before 
the grand jury or at trial and that when he told the prosecutor that he 
was unsure of some statements that he had.made to the grand jury, the 
prosecutor told him that when he testified he was "just to tell" what 
he could remember and what he knew was the truth. 
) 
) 
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to lay the necessary foundation. It is thus clear that petitioner 
now relies solely on matters known to him at the time of trial. 
The petition next alleges that the prosecution suppressed 
evidence favorable to the defense, namely, out-of-court state-
ments by Brajevich that were inconsistent with his testimony 
at trial. According to the petition, an attorney informed peti-
tioner before trial that a member of the district attorney's 
staff told him that Brajevich had lied to the grand jury in 
order to secure an indictment and had made tape recorded 
statements to the police contrary to his testimony before the 
grand jury, and that if petitioner could obtain the statements 
or the tapes "it would probably win his case." Petitioner 
sought to subpoena the statements, but the officials denied that 
such statements existed, and his motion for pretrial discovery 
of the statements was dismissed. At trial, however, an officer 
admitted in response to petitioner's questions that he had "the 
documents" containing Brajevich's statements. A document 
of over 100 pages was then brought into court, but petitioner 
was allowed to see only one and one-half pages. As the opinion 
on appeal shows, the trial court was satisfied that it did not 
relate to the charges in the indictment. In denying a motion 
for a new trial the court stated that the report contained 
information furnished by Brajevich "relating to offenses in 
other counties as well as in this county, which had nothing 
at all to do with the case." On appeal it was concluded that 
the court did not err in refusing to permit. inspection of the 
rest of the document. (People v. Darnold, supra, 219 Cal 
App.2d 561,579-582.) 
[6] A defendant can compel the People to produce state-
ments of prosecution witnesses relating to the matters covered 
in their testimony. (Funk v. Superior Court, 52 Cal2d 423, 
424 [340 P.2d 593]; People v. Chapman, 52 Ca1.2d 95, 98 
[338 P.2d 428] ;PeopZe v. Riser, 47 Ca1.2d 566, 586 [301 P.2d 
1], cert. den. 353 U.S. 930 [77 S.Ct. 721, 1 L.Ed.2d 724].) 
[7] When, however, the documents contain matters unrelated 
to the defendant's case whose disclosure would interfere with 
effective law enforcement (see People v. Lopez,60 Ca1.2d 223, 
246 [32 Cal.Rptr. 424, 384 P.2d 16]), the trial court should 
inspect the documents and excise the unrelated parts. These 
parts should be weserved so that the appellate court can re-
examine the entire text to determine the correctness of the 
trial judge's ruling if the defenda~t appeals. [8] Although 
this procedure does not permit defense counsel to determine 
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terial, it affords a reasonable compromise between the de-'I' 
fendant's right to use the statement and the prosecution'8' 
need to withhold confidential information not relating to the) 
case. It is consistent with the rule that public records are 1 
subject to inspection except when expressly made privileged. 1 
(Code Civ. Proc., §§ 1892,1881, subd. 5.) It is the compromise ! 
Congress adopted in the Jencks Act (18 U.RC.A., § 3500), i 
which we believe is an appropriate model for this court to : 
follow in adopting its own rule. (See Decorative Carpets, Inc. \ 
v. State Board of Equalization, 58 Ca1.2d 252, 256 [23 Cal. 1 
Rptr. 589, 373 P.2d 637].) [9] Although the document i 
was not examined by the appellate court on the appeal in this 
case, we cannot assume on collateral attack that the trial court 
acted improperly in refusing to allow petitioner to see the 
parts of the document that the court concluded "had nothing 
at all to do with the case. " 
Petitioner raises again a contention rejected on appeal, 
that it was error not to appoint counsel to represent him in the 
trial court. (People V. Darnold, supra, 219 Cal.App.2d 561, 
579.) According to the opinion on appeal, petitioner told the 
court before trial that he was representing himself, that he had 
been advised that if he did not have sufficient funds to employ 
counsel he had a right to the public defender's services, and 
that he would reserve his decision as to whether he would be 
represented by the public defender but felt confident that he 
would represent himself. He informed the court immediately 
before the selection of the jury that he was representing him-
self, and he did not request that counsel be appointed. Before 
denying petitioner's motion for a new trial the court stated 
that the manner in which petitioner had conducted himself 
throughout the trial showed that he was •• a rather brilliant 
man, in the way he handled his case." [10] Petitioner 
contends in effect that the public defender could not have 
represented him throughout the trial court proceedings because 
the public defender represented Brajevich during part of the 
proceedings and there was a conflict of interest between that 
defendant and petitioner. It would seem, however, that having 
been advised that he had a right to be represented by the public 
defender it was incumbent upon petitioner, had he wished to 
have other counsel assigned, to raise the matter in the trial 
court, aml there is no claim that he did so. 
[11] There is no merit in the contention that Health and 
Safety Code section 12354 ~s so vague as to be unconstitutional 
because it does not contain a definition of the word "ex-
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plosive. "3 Section 12354 provides: "Every person is guilty 
of a felony ... who, ... maliciously uses ... any explosive at 
... any (a) building ... " and section 12350, as it read at the 
time of the offenses charged, provided: "'Explosives,' as 
uscd in this chapter [which includes section 12354] means 
nitro-glycerine, dynamite, vigorite, hercules powder, giant 
powder, or any other high explosive." 
It is further contended that the evidence was insufficient to 
support the verdict, that the court erroneously refused to 
require the prosecutor to testify concerning his good faith 
in asking certain questions on cross-examination, that the court 
improperly failed to give certain instructions, and that the 
verdict of acquittal as to Le Fave was inconsistent with the 
verdict of guilt as to the remaining defendants. [12] These 
arguments were rejected on appeal, and habeas corpus ordi-
narily cannot serve as a second appeal. (In re Winchester 
(1960) 53 Cal.2d 528, 532 [2 Cal.Rptr. 296, 348 P.2d 904].) 
The order to show cause is discharged and the petition 
denied. 
McComb, J., Peters, J., Tobriner, J., Peek, J., Burke, J., 
and Schauer,J.· concurred. 
Petitioner's application for a rehearing was denied Feb-
ruary 24, 1965. Mosk, J., did not participate therein. 
30n appeal the District Court of Appeal rejected a related argument 
to the effect that section 12354, "as applied in this ease, where no 
d.cfinition of an 'explosive' was given in an instruction, is uncon&titu· 
honal. " The court stated that the indictment charged that the explosive 
used was dynamite, that the word "explosive" was commonplace, and 
that it was not necessary to define it in an instruction. (People v. 
Darnold, supra, 2]9 CaJ.App.2d 561, 583.) 
-Retired Associate Justice of the Supreme Court sitting under assign· 
ment by the Chairman of the Judicial Council. 
G2 C.:ad_ 
